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Worker mobility is one of the most important values in
an entrepreneurial society, where most jobs are created
by small businesses. The present health care system is
a big brake on that.
President Bill Clinton
Health insurance and health care provision have claimed a prominent place on
the policy agenda in the United States. Critics argue that the status quo has led
to spiraling health care costs, an inequitable distribution of quality medical
care, and a failure to provide care to many individuals. Further, there is a per-
ception that the dominant form of providing health insurance in the United
States—private provision as part of employee compensation—interferes with
smooth functioning of the labor market. The statement (above) by President
Bill Clinton
1 is characteristic of claims that individuals are locked into jobs
because of their fear of large changes in their health insurance status if they
change jobs. Clearly, to the extent that this is true, a U.S.-style system of pro-
viding this fundamental part of the social safety net interferes with the efficient
matching of employers and employees. Other things equal, one would prefer
to avoid such a labor market inefficiency when providing health insurance.
Do individuals forgo changing jobs on the basis of health insurance? In a
recent CBS/New York Times survey, roughly 30 percent of respondents indi-
cated that they had stayed in a job to retain their current health insurance cover-
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1. Quotation from Greider, W., P. J. O'Rourke, H. S. Thompson, and J. S. Wenner (1992), The
Rolling Stone interview: Bill Clinton, Rolling Stone, 17 September, 44.
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age.
2 In other suggestive evidence, a KPMG Peat Marwick survey cited in the
Wall Street Journal indicated that job switching may be impeded by the ab-
sence of coverage for preexisting conditions, a situation affecting over two-
thirds of employees.
3 In addition, researchers have begun to analyze the job
lock issue. The results in Madrian (1992), the first careful econometric analysis
of the issue, suggest the presence of job lock from health insurance in the
United States.
In contrast to the U.S. system, virtually all German citizens are guaranteed
health insurance as part of a privately operated but compulsory health insur-
ance system. As a result, the insurance is apparently portable, and one would
expect that it would have no impact on job arrangements. However, one feature
of the German system is that individuals may pay different—perhaps very dif-
ferent—premiums for essentially the same coverage. Moreover, the cost of
coverage will depend upon the insurance company, or sickness fund, chosen
by each employer. Accordingly, health insurance may be portable, but the price
is not. In some circumstances, however, individuals—not their employers—
choose the sickness fund that provides for their health insurance, thereby
providing portability of both coverage and price. Ceteris paribus, one would
anticipate a greater propensity to move among those individuals whose in-
surance does not change in price across jobs. To the extent that this is an
important issue, changes in the price of health insurance when switching
jobs offer a potential impediment to the smooth functioning of the German
labor market.
The basic goal of this paper is to assess the empirical magnitude of health
insurance-related impediments to job mobility in the United States and Ger-
many. It is important to stress at the outset that the impact on labor market
efficiency is not the sole, or even the best, means by which to gauge the perfor-
mance of a health insurance system. One might, for example, wish to assess
the efficiency of the insurance market itself.
4 Still, a comparison of the U.S.
and German experiences may provide input in assessing the relative strengths
of the alternative systems.
To anticipate the basic results, I find little evidence that health insurance
provision interferes with job mobility in either the United States or Germany.
The outline for the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 6.1 looks at
health insurance and labor market mobility in the United States, focusing on
the job lock hypothesis. In section 6.2,1 examine the role of health insurance
financing in labor market mobility in Germany. The final section contains a
summary and assesses the implications of the results.
2. New York Times (1991), 26 September, 1. The question asked was: "Have you or anyone else
in your household ever decided to stay in a job you wanted to leave mainly because you didn't
want to lose health coverage?"
3. Wall Street Journal (1991), 31 December, Al.
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6.1 Health Insurance and the Labor Market in the United States
As noted at the outset, policy toward health insurance is currently much
debated in the United States. In part, this reflects the increasing share of na-
tional resources devoted to health care expenditures; the share of such spend-
ing in net national product rose from 4.8 percent to 13.7 percent between 1950
and 1990 (Aaron 1991, table 3-1). In addition, there is widespread concern that
the large number of uninsured families leaves a critical part of the popula-
tion, especially children, needlessly vulnerable to health problems. Finally,
there is the notion that the tradition of packaging health insurance along
with other job-related benefits may have detrimental effects on labor market
efficiency.
Some suggestive evidence on the latter issue—the job lock conjecture—in
the United States is displayed in table 6.1. As detailed below, the 1984 wave
of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) identifies individuals receiving
employer-provided health insurance. The table shows the frequency with
which those who do and do not receive such health insurance change employ-
ers in subsequent years. The job transition rates are for the one-year period
from 1984 to 1985 and the three-year span between 1984 and 1987.
5 To the
extent that job lock is a significant feature of labor market dynamics, transi-
tions between employers should be relatively higher among the uninsured and
relatively lower among those who receive health insurance. That is, in terms
of the table, the proportion of the entries in the first row of each category, under
"Job Change," should be greater than the proportion of the entries in the second
row. Looking first at the transitions for married individuals, one finds exactly
the predicted pattern for both one-year and three-year transitions.
6 Also re-
ported below each transition category is a Chi-square test statistic. In each
case, the transition rates of the insured are significantly different from those of
uninsured. Turning to single individuals, one finds the same pattern: transition
rates are lower for the insured. Once again, the differences are statistically dif-
ferent.
To be sure, transition tables focus on a single variable—insurance here—
and thus ignore many aspects of the decision to change jobs. For this reason,
they are not a powerful test of the job lock hypothesis. This section is devoted
to developing a more complete assessment of the role of job lock. Before doing
so, however, I begin with a brief review of private and public health insurance
institutions in the United States. In the subsequent subsection, I discuss infor-
mation available regarding health insurance in the PSID, the source of
individual-level data for the United States in this study. Section 6.1.3 discusses
5. The sample consists of full-time employed individuals aged twenty-five to fifty-five. I follow
the recommendations of Brown and Light (1992) in identifying job changes.
6. At each step in the analysis that follows, results for two-year transitions are quite similar to

























































Notes: Numbers in parentheses = column entry + (no job change + job change). \
2
 = Chi-
square test statistic for the null hypothesis that those with and without insurance have the same
transition rates.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
the empirical facts regarding the uninsured as revealed by these data.
7 In the
final section, I undertake some simple multivariate analyses designed to quan-
tify the importance of health insurance in reducing labor market mobility.
6.1.1 The Provision of Health Insurance
For working-age individuals and their dependents, employer-provided pri-
vate coverage is the dominant source of health insurance in the United States.
Two out of every three Americans under the age of 65, constituting roughly
75 percent of employees, are covered by employer-provided private insurance
(Aaron 1991, 54). The precise terms of this coverage, however, vary widely. In
part due to the existence of alternative health care providers such as health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) and in part because many employers sup-
port more than a single plan, the variance in actual coverage and its cost is
enormous.
There is widespread government involvement in the provision of health in-
surance as well. Perhaps the most important policy is the exclusion of premi-
ums for employer-provided insurance from taxable income under the U.S. indi-
vidual income tax. The value of this exclusion is nearly $80 billion
8 and
7. As discussed below, the PSID does not ask directly about insurance coverage. Instead, indi-
viduals are classified as uninsured if they do not receive employer-provided health insurance.
8. Calculated from Congressional Budget Office (1992, 258). The taxation of employer-paid
insurance would generate $230 billion in income tax revenues and $160 billion in payroll tax
revenues over the period 1993-97. Converting the total ($390 billion) into an annual average yields
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provides a clear incentive to add health insurance as a fringe benefit.
9 In addi-
tion, Medicare and Medicaid are large-scale programs that provide health in-
surance. Retired individuals who worked in employment covered by Social
Security or railroad retirement are eligible for Medicare, which began in 1966.
The program is divided into two parts: Part A covers the costs of hospitaliza-
tion and some nursing home care; Part B covers physicians' charges. Part B is
limited to covering 80 percent of allowable charges above a $100 deductible,
so there is an incentive to purchase private, "medigap" insurance.
1
0
Medicaid is a health insurance program for low-income individuals that cov-
ers roughly 9 percent of the population (Wolfe 1992). In practice, it consists
of individual programs in each of the states, operating under general guidelines
from the federal government. The federal government finances part of the cost
by offering matching grants to those states that offer specified services to target
populations. In particular, states are required to offer benefits to recipients of
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI).
6.1.2 Analyzing Health Insurance, Using the PSID
The empirical analysis presented below uses the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics. The PSID offers many advantages, in particular a wealth of longitudi-
nal data on labor market performance and a structure comparable to that of the
Socioeconomic Panel of Germany (GSOEP) data used in the empirical analy-
sis of Germany." Unfortunately, there are drawbacks as well, the most im-
portant of which is the relative paucity of information on the health insurance
status of individuals. Ideally, one would like to have annual information on the
type, cost, and coverage from all sources of health insurance. Instead, even the
relatively circumscribed information on health insurance coverage is limited
to a single year.
In the 1984 wave of the PSID, individuals were asked the question: "Does
your employer pay for any medical, surgical, or hospital insurance that covers
any illness or injury that might happen to you when you are not at work?" For
married couples, there is an identical question regarding the payment of health
insurance by the spouse's employer. In what follows, those individuals who
answered "yes" are classified as having employer-provided health insurance,
and those who answered "no" will be referred to as "uninsured."
1
2 Clearly, this
is a great departure from the ideal. In particular, some of those categorized as
9. See, for example, Sloan and Adamache (1986) or Hamermesh and Woodbury (1990) for a
discussion of the relationship between tax policy and the provision of fringe benefits.
10. In 1990, Congress placed limits on the medigap insurers, especially limiting their ability to
exclude those with preexisting conditions, mandating experience rating, and requiring a minimum
ratio of benefit payments to premium income. See Rovner (1990).
11. For a description of each data source, see the appendix.
12. Those that answered either "don't know" or "not applicable" were eliminated from the
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uninsured may have purchased private insurance or obtained access in some
other way. Further, there is no information regarding the extent or cost of cover-
age, especially the degree to which spouses are covered by any plan. In what
follows, I will interpret the results, using the assumption that individuals are
eligible for coverage under their spouse's plan, if present, but a degree of cau-
tion is clearly warranted. Lastly, the focus below is on private health insurance.
To the extent that the absence of private insurance is offset by Medicare or
Medicaid, the labor market behavior of individuals will be altered.
1
3
6.1.3 Who Are the Uninsured?
Estimates indicate that there are thirty to forty million uninsured individuals
in the United States, including a substantial fraction that are uninsured
throughout each year (Wolfe 1992). In addition, there is concern that the frac-
tion of the population that is uninsured has risen over the past decade.
1
4 As
noted above, the PSID does not contain information regarding health insurance
provision for multiple years. Thus, it is not possible to address many interesting
questions regarding the dynamics of insurance, such as the extent to which
uninsured status is transitory, the extent to which the rise in the number of
uninsured reflects changes in family structure, and so forth. It is possible, how-
ever, to take a "snapshot" view of the uninsured population.
In doing so, I focus on employed individuals ages twenty-five to fifty-five,
the same group for which I test the job lock hypothesis. Thus, this section is
best viewed as providing a glimpse at the characteristics of the working unin-
sured. The basic facts are laid out in table 6.2. Part A focuses on married indi-
viduals. In the top table the upper-left entry indicates for 49 percent of the
married individuals who did not have insurance, neither did their spouses. In
contrast, the upper-right entry indicates that the remaining 51 percent of the
uninsured were married to individuals whose employers provided health insur-
ance. The second row of the matrix gives corresponding information for those
with insurance. Notice that the probability of having a spouse with insurance
is higher for the uninsured than for the insured. Put differently, the probability
of having insurance is negatively correlated among spouses. The Chi-square
statistic (16.4) indicates that this correlation is statistically significant at the 1
percent level. Thus, spousal insurance tends weakly to offset the lack of insur-
ance for a married individual.
From here, I proceed in two routes. The data on the left investigate the rela-
tionship between the individual reporting employer-provided insurance (Indi-
13. In practice, two pieces of evidence suggest that the existence of government-provided insur-
ance does not have a significant impact on the results. First, there is no significant difference in
behavior between those belonging to the low-income subsample and those in the remainder of the
PSID. Second, eliminating all individuals who report assistance from any income assistance pro-
gram (Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Supplemental Security Income, unemployment
insurance, or Medicaid) does not affect the basic nature of the results.
14. Most counts of the uninsured are based on the Current Population Survey, and the wording
of the questions in this survey has changed over time. As a result, there is some ambiguity in
interpreting changes in the number of uninsured (see Swartz 1989).163 Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency
Table 6.2 Insurance Relationships: Characteristics of Insured and Uninsured





















































































































Notes: Each entry is the number of individuals, expressed as a decimal fraction of the total (e.g.,
male plus female) in that category (e.g., no insurance), x
2 denotes the Chi-square test statistic for
independence of the rows and columns.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
vidual") and the characteristics of such individuals. In contrast, in the data on
the right, we undertake the same comparisons, using instead as the measure of
insurance whether either the individual or the spouse (or both) has employer-
provided insurance ("Individual or Spouse").
Consider first the results for those that report receiving employer-provided164 Douglas Holtz-Eakin
coverage. A glance down the column reveals (statistically) significant differ-
ences along three major dimensions. First, the uninsured are more likely to be
female than are the insured. Second, the uninsured are more likely to report
that they are in poor health (in 1984, 2.9 percent in poor health, compared with
0.5 percent of the insured). Third, and not very surprising, the insured are
much more likely to be union workers than are the uninsured population. The
latter suggests that large changes in the status of unions may be related to
changes in the uninsured population in the United States. Interestingly, the
uninsured have roughly the same racial composition as the insured.
When one looks at the data on the right, a slightly different picture emerges.
Recall that an individual is classified as insured here if either the individual or
the individual's spouse (or both) report receiving employer-provided medical
insurance. Using this definition, the gender composition of the uninsured and
the insured populations is essentially the same. In contrast, we now find differ-
ences along racial lines. The uninsured population has a greater fraction of
nonwhite individuals, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 per-
cent level. The remaining two relationships are unchanged: the uninsured are
more likely to be in poor health and to be nonunion workers.
Part B of table 6.2 undertakes a comparable analysis for single individuals.
The same patterns emerge from the data. Just as with married individuals, the
uninsured tend to be female, nonwhite, in poor health, and nonunion workers.
Of course, it is desirable to examine these relationships simultaneously
rather than in a sequence of bivariate comparisons. The probit analysis in table
6.3 is designed for this purpose. The table shows the results of estimating a
probit model in which the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual
has employer-provided insurance, and zero otherwise.
1
5 It is important to note
that these probit estimates are designed to be descriptive; there is no putative
causal relationship. Instead, they serve to summarize the empirical relationship
between uninsured status and a myriad of other (endogenously determined)
variables.
There are several interesting results. First, the coefficients on age, education,
and number of children are insignificant.
1
6 The last in particular indicates no
differential propensity for those with children to be at risk of not having health
insurance. Similarly, the lack of correlation with race persists in this analysis;
neither of the coefficients for white and black individuals is individually sig-
nificant. (Also, one cannot reject the null that they are equal.)
There are a wide variety of variables that do enter significantly. The dummy
variables to control for occupation and industry capture statistical differences
15. A more expansive definition of coverage would include those whose spouses have employer-
provided insurance. Estimating a probit using this definition yields results broadly similar to those
in table 6.3. To the extent that they differ, the probability of coverage rises with age, declines for
nonwhites, and is unrelated to sex and tenure.
16. One cannot reject the joint hypothesis that both age and age squared have coefficients equal
to zero.165 Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency
Table 6.3 Probit Analysis: Probability of Employer-Provided Insurance*
Variable
Age







































































































*Based on 5,037 observations. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual has employ-
er-provided insurance, and zero otherwise.
in coverage across different sectors of the economy and job levels within firms.
Similarly, the more detailed characteristics of the job also help to predict insur-
ance coverage. The probability of medical insurance rises with wage earnings
by the individual, tenure on the job, union membership, and whether the indi-
vidual's job is covered by a collective bargaining agreement ("union job").
Thus, the presence of medical insurance reflects good jobs—that is, jobs with
good wages, stability, and other benefits.
Individual characteristics matter as well. Females are less likely to be in-
sured, although separate probits for married and single individuals (not re-
ported) reveal that this finding stems from married females. (This also explains166 Douglas Holtz-Eakin
the negative but statistically insignificant effect on the variable for married
individuals.) The probability of insurance falls with net assets, likely reflecting
the ability of wealthy individuals to purchase insurance directly or forgo it
altogether. An individual's work history also enters the likelihood of having
insurance in a significant fashion; the probability of being insured falls when
the average number of weeks of unemployment between 1981 and 1983 ("aver-
age unemployment") rises.
Finally, in contrast to the raw correlation in table 6.2, the probit analysis
indicates no significant correlation between the presence of a spouse who has
employer-provided insurance and the probability of having health insurance.
A difficulty in interpreting such a reduced form, however, stems from the fact
that some spouses may elect to decline insurance coverage. In such circum-
stances, it is not obvious how the individual will answer the survey question
on insurance coverage.
6.1.4 Health Insurance and Job Mobility
Should employment-based health insurance reduce job mobility? At a first
pass, the likely answer seems to be no. Health insurance is only part of the
overall compensation package for a worker. Thus, one might anticipate that
wages or other noninsurance aspects of the total compensation package would
vary so as to offset differences in the cost of providing health insurance. In-
deed, Gruber (1992) finds that changes in the costs of insuring workers for
maternity benefits are reflected by almost identical offsets in wages. Thus, if
workers differ in terms of the cost of health insurance, the result could still be
a compensation package that matches the productivity of each worker.
Changes in health status, however, complicate this simple story. Consider an
individual who experiences a significant decline in health. As part of his or her
current group plan, say, he or she may be relatively inexpensive to insure. As a
result of experience rating, however, this cost would rise if the individual
moved to another firm, and the individual would be a less attractive candidate
for other jobs unless he or she was willing to accept lower wages in the new
job. Thus, in the current firm, the individual could receive health insurance of
the same value and a larger wage income than in another firm. In this way,
employment-based insurance may act as a "tax" on labor mobility by driving a
wedge between the cost of insurance in a new firm versus the current employer.
Notice, however, that even this effect may be short lived. To the extent that
insurance companies raise premiums, even the current employer may move to
a mix of greater health insurance and less wage income.
A similar scenario may follow from clauses precluding coverage for pre-
existing conditions. A 1987 survey indicated that 57 percent of employers had
clauses limiting or excluding coverage for expenses stemming from preexisting
conditions in their insurance arrangements. For smaller firms these are even
more prevalent, with 64 percent of small employers (less than five hundred167 Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency
employees) having such clauses.
1
7 These features of the insurance market have
led to many calls for reforms that move away from employer-based insurance
(see, e.g., Mitchell 1990) on the grounds that the features trap workers in their
current jobs. Still, firms have the option of paying more to cover preexisting
conditions, so the presence of job lock behavior and its efficiency conse-
quences is ultimately an empirical issue.
While there is a relatively large literature on the relationship between fringe
benefits and job mobility (especially pensions), there is a paucity of studies
examining the role of health insurance alone.
1
8 The major exception is Madrian
(1992), who finds some evidence of job lock, using the 1987 National Medical
Expenditure Survey. Madrian focuses on three comparisons to find evidence
of job lock: (1) the job mobility of insured men whose spouses have health
insurance coverage versus those whose spouses do not, (2) the behavior of men
with large versus small families, and (3) the behavior of men with pregnant
spouses versus those who are not expecting a child. In each case, mobility is
lower in those situations where the current insurance coverage is more valu-
able. Indeed the empirical magnitudes are quite striking. Madrian estimates
that voluntary mobility differentials due to job lock range from 25 percent
(estimated using the first parameter) to 50 percent (using the third). The exis-
tence of mobility differentials of this magnitude suggests that an insurance
system divorced from employment status (see, e.g., Mitchell 1990) would en-
hance efficiency.
To see the nature of the test for job lock, consider the following simplified
model. Let the probability of changing employers be given by
(1) /?(change) = d>(z) + aldl + a2d2 + a3d3 + a4d
where ({>(•) captures non-insurance-related aspects of the job change decision.
The variable d{ is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the individual is the
only person in the household to have insurance and equal to zero otherwise; d2
is defined similarly and indicates that only the individual's spouse has insur-
ance; d3 equals one if both the individual and the spouse are insured, and d4
indicates that neither has insurance. (It is assumed that if the spouse has insur-
ance, the individual can be covered by it.) If the lack of portable insurance
impedes job transitions, it should be apparent only when employment and in-
17. The survey of two thousand employers offering health insurance was conducted by Foster
Higgens, an employee benefits consulting firm (see Cotton 1991).
18. Mitchell (1982, 1983) explores the link between fringe benefits and job mobility. There is
also a substantial literature examining the degree to which pension plans (and their vesting rules)
produce additional job attachment (see, e.g., Allen, Clark, and McDermed 1991). Gustman and
Steinmeier (1990), however, find that jobs with pensions also contain a wage premium that domi-
nates the financial effects of pension provision; they conclude that the wage premium is the source
of lower propensities to leave these jobs. As was noted above, the probability that a job provides
health insurance is also positively correlated with the wages received by the individual.168 Douglas Holtz-Eakin
surance are tied. In terms of equation (1), this corresponds to having dx = 1.
For all others, the access to insurance is independent of employment. For ex-
ample, if d2 = 1, then the individual is covered by the spouse's policy, which
is unaffected by a change to a new employer. Or if d4 = 1, the individual has
no insurance to lose, and it is therefore not a factor when changing jobs.
It turns out to be useful to express this in a slightly different form:
(2) p(change) = <J>(z) + Po + ^Self+ $2Spouse + $3Both ,
where Self indicates that the individual has insurance, Spouse indicates that the
spouse has insurance, and Both is the interaction (product) of these two vari-
ables. A bit of algebra reveals the correspondence between equations (1) and
(2):
(3) /7(change) = <J>(2) + (Po + PX + (Po + $2)d2 + Oo+P, + P2+P3M3+M4-
Consider now equation (1). As argued above, if individuals are locked into
their current jobs by health insurance, it should be apparent only when d] = 1.
Note that the other states are equivalent from the perspective of health insur-
ance—the individual loses no insurance if he or she leaves a job. Hence, one
would expect a2 = a3 = a4. Thus, the notion that employer-based insurance
affects job transitions amounts to testing the null hypothesis that a, = a2( =
a3 = a4). This has several implications for the parameters in equation (3): (1)
a2 = a3 implies that (3, + P3 = 0; (2) a3 — a4 implies that P, + P2 + P3 = 0, so that these together require that (32 = 0; and (3) a, = a2 implies that P, =
P2, so that Pj must also be zero. Collecting results, this requires that P3, the
coefficient on the interaction variables (Both), be zero. Thus, this line of rea-
soning suggests the (not surprising) result that one should test whether all of
the coefficients on the insurance variables in equation (2) are equal to zero. If
they are, this is consistent with the notion that health insurance has no effect
on transitions among jobs. Rejecting this null hypothesis, however, suggests
the presence of job lock due to health insurance.
However, one could argue that the presence of an employer-provided insur-
ance plan is really serving as an indicator of whether the individual has a "good
job"; the probit analysis in table 6.3 leads directly to this notion. If so, all that
such an exercise establishes is that people are less likely to leave good jobs
than bad jobs. In terms of equation (1), the "good jobs" argument essentially
says that (j)(-) does not control completely for attributes of the job that are
correlated with the presence of insurance. It is likely, then, that the coefficients
on dx and d3 are contaminated by these job-related attributes. A similar argu-
ment may be put forward with regard to spouses; that is, the coefficients on d2
and d3 reflect unobserved attributes of the spouse. Thus, one may rewrite equa-











where j is the contamination due to job effects and s is the corresponding con-
tamination due to spouse effects. Because of the presence of s and/ it is not
possible to test the relevant hypothesis regarding the coefficients in equation
(1). Indeed, one cannot even learn about health insurance effects by looking at
(^2 —/i)' (^3 ~ 7i)»
 o
r (74 ~ 7i)' because each contains either s or j. However,
bringing equation (3) into play allows one to compare the differences of the
differences, thereby eliminating the unobserved attributes and isolating the ef-
fect on job changes. Algebraically, (73 — 72) — (7, — 74) = (a3 — a2) — (al — a4), which does not depend on s or j. Under the null hypothesis, this should
equal zero. Returning to equation (3), it is straightforward to verify that (a3 —
a2) - (a! - a4) = (33. Thus, testing the null hypothesis in the presence of
job effects and spouse effects involves testing whether the coefficient on the
interaction variable differs from zero. Intuitively, in the absence of health in-
surance effects on transitions, the impact of having an employer-provided plan
should not depend on whether the worker can be covered by a spouse's plan.
Table 6.4 looks at the propensity to change employers for married individu-
als who have employer-provided medical insurance. Within each gender the






















































Notes: Numbers in parentheses = column entry -^ (no job change + job change), x
2
 = Chi-
square test statistic for the null hypothesis that those with and without insurance have the same
transition rates.170 Douglas Holtz-Eakin
rows display the mobility rates for those whose spouses do not have insurance
versus those whose spouses have employer-provided insurance. Consider the
results for married males. For one-year transitions, one finds that 12.8 percent
of males with an insured spouse undertook a job transition, and this exceeds
the 9.9 percent rate for those whose spouses do not receive insurance. The
greater propensity to change jobs is suggestive of the job lock phenomenon. As
indicated by the Chi-square test statistic, however, the difference in behavior is
not statistically significant.
1
9 The lack of an effect from spousal insurance is
even clearer in the three-year transition matrix. Here the transition rates are
virtually identical in each row.
Table 6.4 displays analogous transition data for married women. In both time
spans, the propensity to change employers is greater, not smaller, for those
whose spouses do not have insurance. Again, however, the differences are not
statistically significant. Thus, the raw data reveal little linkage between insur-
ance status and job mobility.
Intuitively, one would also expect job lock (if any) to become more im-
portant as insurance became more valuable to the individual. Using the infor-
mation from the PSID, one may focus on several indicators of the value of
insurance. First, the PSID contains measures of health status for 1984 and 1986
and of the change in health status between 1982 and 1984. Thus, for example,
one might expect that health insurance would be more valuable to those with
poor health in 1984.
2
0 In a probit equation for job mobility, then, this would
lead one to anticipate that the interaction between poor health and the provision
of health insurance would tend to decrease mobility; that is, the sign of the
coefficient on such an interaction variable should be negative. In contrast, poor
health should raise the value of access to medical insurance via one's spouse.
I investigate these interactions in the analysis of the PSID.
The use of 1984 health status places the emphasis on contemporaneous rela-
tionships. Alternatively, it may be that individuals anticipate the need to ad-
dress developing health conditions, and they value their current insurance more
highly as a result. To gain a feel for this aspect of the data, I perform an analo-
gous examination of the effects of interacting future health status (that reported
for 1986) with the provision of health insurance in 1984. As before, one would
anticipate that the coefficient on such an interaction variable should be (if any-
thing) negative.
Of course, the discussion of preexisting conditions indicates that job lock
may hinge on the change in health status as much as or more than on the state
of the individual's health. The 1984 wave of the PSID also contains survey
19. The difference between the mobility rate of uninsured males whose spouses do and do not
have insurance is 0.037. Thus, the differences-in-differences point estimate of the effect of insur-
ance is negative: -0.008 = 0.029 - 0.037.
20.1 focus on the "poor health" response in what follows. Attempts at first distinctions in health
status provided no additional insights.171 Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency
information on health status in 1984 versus 1982.1 focus on those who report
that their health is worse in 1984 than in 1982.
2
1 The logic of preexisting condi-
tions indicates that the worsening of health condition should make health in-
surance more valuable and thus lower mobility. As before, I check the degree
to which the data are consistent with this hypothesis by examining the coeffi-
cients on an interaction between the variable indicating provision of health
insurance and that indicating a worsening of health status over the two years
prior to 1984.
As a last check on the interaction between the value of insurance to the
individual and job mobility, I focus on interactions with the age of the individ-
ual. Here, the basic notion is simple: as one ages, the expected cost of medical
care rises, ceteris paribus. Thus, as before, the interaction between age and
employer-provided health insurance should serve to reduce mobility.
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the health status of the individual.
However, the health status of others living with (and covered by the policy for)
the individual may have just as important an effect on the perceived value of
the benefit. I use the number of children living in the family to proxy for the
expected value of the insurance policy. If correct, one would expect the coeffi-
cient on such an interaction variable (number of children and employer-
provided insurance) to be negative.
No empirical strategy is entirely without pitfalls, and the approach used
herein is no exception. Thus far, for example, the discussion has treated health
insurance status as exogenous. To the extent that this is not the case, two related
problems arise. First, it is difficult to understand the notion of job lock when
the health insurance package is (in part) self-inflicted. Second, the right-side
variables in the probit equations below will be endogenous, and more-refined
statistical techniques will be required to identify residual evidence of job lock.
A conceptually similar issue arises in the literature on pensions. Allen, Clark,
and McDermed (1991), for example, model the endogenous determination of
pension status. In addition, when health insurance status is endogenous, there
may be some gain to explicitly modeling the distribution of insurance among
spouses. These extensions are beyond the scope of this paper.
Another caveat is that the absence of information on the benefits package
for health insurance makes the interpretation of the dummy variables more
tenuous. While the interaction effects discussed above are designed to reveal
the differential value of insurance across individuals, they are unlikely to cap-
ture fully such variations in the net benefits of insurance coverage.
Last, two minor footnotes on legal institutions are in order. First, the Consol-
idated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA) contains provisions (ef-
fective 1 July 1986) guaranteeing access to health insurance for up to eighteen
months after separating from a job. (For a full discussion of COBRA, see
21. Again, attempts to make finer distinctions yielded little additional insight.172 Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Flynn 1992.) Thus, while I examine job changes as late as 1987 below, those
that occur after 1985 are subject to the caveat that COBRA may make job
transitions easier. Similarly, even prior to COBRA many states had state-





The results of testing for health insurance-related job lock in the PSID are
summarized in table 6.5 and table 6.6. Begin by looking at table 6.5, which
reports the coefficient estimates for three variables indicating health insurance
status. The first is a dichotomous variable equal to one for those that have
employer-provided health insurance. The second is an analogously defined
variable indicating that the spouse has health insurance. The final variable is
the interaction between the first two variables and indicates that both the indi-
vidual and the spouse have insurance. For single individuals, the last two
clearly are not appropriate.
Part A of the table reports the coefficient estimates for one-year transitions,
while Part B is devoted to three-year transitions. Within each part, two sets of
estimates are reported for each sample. The "No Controls" estimates are ob-
tained by estimating a probit equation for job transitions in which only the
insurance variables (and a constant) appear on the right-hand side. The "Con-
trols" estimates contain a rich set of noninsurance control variables and are
discussed below. Examination of the "No Controls" estimates suggests two
broad conclusions. First, for the probits analyzing married men and women,
the coefficient on the interaction variable "Both insurance" is always on the
wrong sign and statistically insignificant. Recall from the earlier discussion
that this variable is the natural point of focus when one suspects that the speci-
fication does not fully capture attributes of jobs or spouses that are correlated
with the provision of employer health insurance. The "No Controls" estimates
in table 6.5 are an extreme case because no other controls are included in the
equation. Second, from a job lock perspective, even the econometric perfor-
mance of the "Own insurance" variable is somewhat uneven; only for married
men is it uniformly negative and statistically significant.
The columns labeled "Controls" in table 6.5 contain the results for the insur-
ance variables of fully specified mobility equations for one-year and three-year
transitions, respectively.
2
3 Before discussing the variables related to the job
lock hypothesis, consider the variables included in the probit to control for
other aspects of job mobility. Each probit equation contains dummy variables
for occupation and industry, reflecting differential conditions in these markets.
In an attempt to control, albeit incompletely, for non-health insurance attri-
butes of individuals' jobs, I include reported tenure on the job, dummy vari-
22. A statistical test of the importance of dummy variables for each state did not reject the null
hypothesis of no significant differences across states.




































































































































* Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
ables for each of the following: whether the job is covered by a collective
bargaining agreement, whether the job provides dental insurance, whether it
provides life insurance, and whether there is a pension plan. To further refine
the pension measures, two additional variables are included. The first identifies
those who have been vested in the pension plan, while the remaining variable
indicates those who participate in a defined contribution pension plan.
Also present in the equation are individual attributes such as age, education,
race, an indicator variable for health-related work limitations, an indicator vari-
able for poor health (in 1984), the number of children in the household, and
union membership status.
Finally, the equations control for resources and prices associated with the
mobility decision by including wage earnings in the current job and net assets
of the individual. For married individuals, the wages of the spouse are included
as well. (Descriptive statistics for key variables are shown in appendix table
6A.1.)
Consider now the variables related to medical insurance. For married indi-174 Douglas Holtz-Eakin
viduals, as discussed earlier, the interaction variable is the focus of attention.
For single individuals, such an interaction is not available. However, one may
be able to discern evidence of job lock by looking at the interaction between
insurance and health status or other variables. I return to these tests below.
Column 2 of part A in table 6.5 shows the estimates for married men when
focusing on job changes over the one-year period 1984-85. The coefficient for
having insurance is —0.14 but not statistically significant. As argued above,
however, neither this coefficient nor the coefficient on spouse insurance (0.25)
is the proper center of attention. Instead, the coefficient on the interaction vari-
able is likely to be the most reliable indicator of job lock. The estimated coef-
ficient is positive (0.09), which is suggestive of job lock but not statistically
significant at conventional levels. Thus, in contrast to Madrian (1992), these
data do not provide evidence of health insurance-related job lock.
The results for married women present a slightly different picture, as the
coefficient on "Own insurance" is positive and imprecisely estimated. How-
ever, the interaction variable is of the "wrong" sign from the job lock perspec-
tive and, as in the case of married men, statistically insignificant.
The basic thrust of these results is reinforced by those reported in part B,
which shows the estimates for three-year transitions. For both married men
and married women, the point estimate of the interaction variable is negative
and has a large standard error. In sum, using the presence of spouse insurance
to test for job lock gives little support to the proposition. Thus, these estimates
do not favor identifying health insurance as a major culprit in job market inef-
ficiencies.
Recall from the discussion surrounding equation (4) that the coefficient on
the own insurance variable may be contaminated by correlation with unob-
served attributes of the job. If one could be confident that such unobserved
heterogeneity was quantitatively small, then it would be possible to test for job
lock by direct examination of the own insurance variable, a testing procedure
that would permit examination of the results for single individuals (columns 6
and 8 of parts A and B as well. In this context, a comparison of the No Controls
and Controls columns is relevant. The estimated coefficients for the insurance
variables appear somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of controls for differences
among individuals and jobs. This argues against focusing on the own insurance
variable. Moreover, as noted earlier, the pattern of estimated coefficients for
the own insurance variable in the No Controls columns does not support the
job lock notion. This conclusion is amplified by the results in the Controls
columns.
A simple indicator variable may not adequately capture differences across
individuals in the value of insurance. Hence, as noted earlier, using interactions
between the insurance variable (both insurance) and indicators of the value of
insurance such as poor health, or worsened health, may provide better insight
into the significance of job lock. Moreover, to the extent that these variables
are significant in the mobility equations for single individuals, they permit one175 Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency
to detect job lock where the use of the spouse insurance interaction was not fea-
sible.
Table 6.6 is devoted to summarizing the results of such an exercise. The
table contains ^-statistics to test the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the
interaction between the insurance variable and the variable shown in each row
is zero. Thus, for example, consider the entry in the first row of column 1 of
the table. To generate the test statistic, I estimate a variant of the basic mobility
probit, which also includes the interaction between the both insurance variable
and the dummy variable for poor health in 1984. The test statistic, 1.52, indi-
cates that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for the inter-
action is zero. This procedure is repeated for each of the variables shown in
the table. (For single individuals, the own insurance variable is used for these
interactions.)





































































Note: Test statistics for the null hypothesis that the interaction between the "Both Insurance"
variable (for single individuals, "Own Insurance") and the row variable is zero.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.176 Douglas Holtz-Eakin
What results emerge? There is little in the table to suggest an important or
pervasive effect of job lock. Few of the interactions are statistically significant,
and one that is—the interaction of worsening health status with insurance
among single men—is of the wrong (positive) sign. In sum, using a variety of
indicators of the value of health insurance to the individual does not provide
evidence of job lock in the United States.
6.2 Health Insurance and the Labor Market in Germany
The German systems of health care provision and finance have attracted ris-
ing attention in the United States. As in the United States, the majority of care
in Germany is provided by private sector doctors operating in private hospitals
and financed by health insurance provided by private companies ("sickness
funds," see below). Also in the United States, these private markets are subject
to large-scale government intervention to ensure satisfactory health and bud-
getary outcomes. In 1987, however, health expenditures were only 8.1 percent
of gross domestic product in West Germany, compared with 11.2 percent in
the United States (Aaron 1991, 80, table 4-1). Moreover, mandatory insurance
coverage for virtually all Germans precludes the possibility of large numbers
of uninsured people. For these reasons, some analysts have pointed to the Ger-
man system as a model for U.S. reforms.
2
4
6.2.1 Health Insurance Provision in Germany
The German system of social health insurance
2
5 was introduced by Bismarck
in 1883 and has gradually expanded to cover roughly 90 percent of the popula-
tion.
2
6 The core of the financing system is provided by the roughly 1,150 pri-
vate sickness funds, or insurance companies. Regional associations of sickness
funds, in turn, bargain with regional associations of physicians to determine
the rates charged for specific services.
2
7 Similarly, there are negotiations with
each hospital for specific in-patient rates. All these negotiations are undertaken
within the guidelines for rate increases established by the national committee
(Concerted Action) set up in the 1977 health care reform to control the growth
rate of health costs.
In some broad sense, then, the fund system is decentralized and self-
governed by autonomous administrations. That is, it resembles a private system
in that there are no explicit government agencies. German law requires, how-
24. In this context, it is somewhat ironic that the West German health care and finance system
underwent major reforms in 1977, 1982, 1983, and 1989, in part to address dissatisfaction over
the inability to contain costs.
25. This brief overview draws upon excellent surveys by Glaser (1991), GAO (1991), Henke
(1990), and Reinhardt (1990).
26. The system dates from the Social Insurance Code of 15 June 1883 (Commission of the
European Communities 1990, 50).
27. German physicians do not directly bill the sickness fund for services rendered. Instead, the
regional association of physicians pays its members out of premium income collected from the
sickness funds.177 Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency
ever, that all persons with incomes below a cutoff (in 1989, DM 54,900, or
roughly $27,300 in 1990 U.S. dollars) receive mandatory health insurance cov-
erage. Those people with incomes above the cutoff may voluntarily join the
mandatory system, purchase private health insurance, or remain uninsured.
2
8
In large part, individuals receive insurance from the sickness fund chosen
by their employer. (I will return to the exceptions below.) The retired are cov-
ered by the sickness fund of their former employer, and the unemployed receive
insurance from the sickness fund of their previous employer. Self-employed
individuals must enroll in one of the sickness funds. The health insurance pre-
miums are financed from a variety of sources. The bulk of contributions take
the form of a payroll tax rate, which is statutorily split equally between the
employer and the employee. Government subsidies contribute toward the cost
of covering the retired, the unemployed, and full-time students.
The payroll tax base consists mainly of wage and salary income.
2
9 Health
insurance premiums, and thus payroll tax rates, are based on the average cost
of insurance within each sickness fund. To calculate the rate, an insurance fund
effectively divides the expected insurance costs by the total payroll tax base of
its members. The result is a single payroll tax rate that is applied to the earnings
of each individual (and his or her employer) in the fund. In this way, the Ger-
man system embodies a form of "community rating" in which insurance rates
are independent of the medical risks of individuals and their dependents.
3
0
Rates do depend, however, upon the sickness fund of the insured, with the
result that West German rates ranged from 8 percent to 16 percent in 1990
(Schneider 1991).
Such a system provides clear incentives to migrate from high-cost insurance
funds. Freedom of choice, however, is carefully circumscribed in the German
insurance system. As noted above, employers choose the sickness fund that
covers most of their employees. The most common sickness funds are the Gen-
eral Local Sickness Funds, or local funds organized on a regional basis. In
addition, companies may organize their own establishment sickness funds, or
company funds, to provide insurance to their employees. White-collar workers,
however, also have the option of joining alternative private funds known as
substitute funds, which are organized on a national basis.
3
1 In addition, there
are several sickness funds for specific occupations (guild funds) and for min-
ers, farmers, and mariners.
3
2 In the end, approximately 50 percent of individu-
28. Prior to the 1989 reforms, individuals whose incomes fluctuated first above, then below the
income cutoff simply rejoined the mandatory system, an option that is no longer available.
29. Recently, some pension income has been included in the payroll tax base.
30. It is illegal to charge rates that discriminate by age, but in practice the system moves beyond
even this restriction.
31. As a result of the 1989 reforms, the options of blue-collar workers are now comparable to
those of white-collar workers.
32. The breakdown is as follows: 266 local sickness funds, 691 company sickness funds, 152
guild sickness funds, 19 agricultural sickness funds, 1 seamen's fund, 1 miners' fund, and 15 sub-
stitute sickness funds.178 Douglas Holtz-Eakin
als may choose their own health insurance fund. Note that most of the variation
across funds occurs in the cost of coverage, not benefits received (HCFR
1989, 94).
6.2.2 Health Insurance Information in the GSOEP
With the PSID as the standard for comparison, the German Socioeconomic
Panel (GSOEP) provides relatively good information regarding the insurance
status of each individual. Each year, information is collected regarding whether
the individual has insurance and, if so, from which type of sickness fund. In
addition, there is information about whether the individual is a voluntary or
compulsory member of the sickness fund. Like the PSID, however, the GSOEP




6.2.3 Health Insurance and Job Turnover
Although the German system is designed to provide universal coverage, its
features potentially generate a job lock phenomenon. In this regard, the key
aspect is the degree to which the price of insurance is portable across jobs.
Several cases are straightforward. Individuals with private health insurance,
for example, have insurance that is portable in both access and price. Similarly,
members of guild or substitute sickness funds (each of whom is, by definition,
a voluntary member) will be equally unencumbered by their insurance status.
For the remainder, the possibility of a nonportable price arises. Members of
company funds—voluntary or compulsory—face a change in the cost of
health insurance if they change employers, and the empirical averages indicate
that it will be a higher cost. Schulenburg (1989) reports that the company funds
have the lowest average payroll tax rate among types of sickness funds.
3
4 Simi-
larly, both voluntary and compulsory members of local sickness funds may
have to change funds if the employment switch takes them outside of the cur-
rent area or if their new employer chooses not to use the local sickness fund.
To deal with the ambiguity, I create two variables identifying candidates for
job lock on the basis of health insurance. The first, "Insurance Lock 1," consists
of company fund members, local fund members, and compulsory members of
the "other" category.
3
5 If all employment changes involve interregional moves,
this variable appropriately identifies candidates for job lock. The second vari-
able, "Insurance Lock 2," excludes members of local funds and is appropriate
33. There have been attempts to impute premiums to individuals, but the imputation scheme
does not reflect differences in types of sickness funds. Experimentation with these imputed payroll
tax rates did not prove fruitful, and the analysis presented below does not rely on these measures.
34. See table 6.6. Schulenburg reports that in 1988 the average payroll tax rate required for
health insurance was highest (13.5 percent) in local sickness funds and lowest (11.5 percent) in
company funds.
35. The latter assignment was done on the basis of testing whether the coefficient on such a
variable was different from that on the health lock variable. I could not reject this hypothesis.179 Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency
only for intraregional moves. While only a conjecture, it would seem likely
that the large number of local funds and relatively small land area would com-
bine to make the first measure more appropriate on the whole.
3
6
As with the analysis of the PSID, I begin with a simple look at the data in
the GSOEP. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 contain transition data computed for those with
and those without "Insurance Lock" status. Consider table 6.7, which shows
the transition rates of for individuals with and without the Insurance Lock 1
status. The table first shows a comparison of job mobility rates for married
individuals. For comparability with the analysis of the U.S. data, I restrict the
sample to individuals ages twenty-five to fifty-five who are full-time employ-
ees. The combination of excluding those in the very early stages of their labor
market experience and the general nature of the German labor market contri-
butes to the low overall rate of job transition that characterizes both tables.
Looking at the transition rates in table 6.7, one finds that they are in accord
with the simple hypothesis for both one-year transitions (between 1984 and
1985) and three-year transitions (between 1984 and 1987). Only the former
differences, however, are statistically significant. For single individuals, job
transition rates for the insurance locked are lower over both the one-year and
the three-year horizon; indeed, they are less than one-half the rates for the
control group. Moreover, as shown by the Chi-square statistics, these differ-
ences are significant.
Table 6.8 repeats the analysis using Insurance Lock 2, the more circum-
scribed definition, as the indicator of insurance lock-in. Here the results are
qualitatively similar—transition rates are uniformly lower for married and sin-
gle individuals in the insurance lock category—but the details of statistical
significance differ. As with the transition data from the PSID, such a simple
test is hardly conclusive, so I turn now to a multivariate analysis intended to
shed additional light on the issue.
6.2.4 Probit Analysis
The results of the probit analysis for job lock in the GSOEP, presented in
table 6.9, are organized in a fashion parallel to those for the United States.
3
7
As before, I begin by analyzing transition equations that include only the insur-
ance lock variables. Because of the low overall rate of job transitions, the use of
such a parsimonious specification avoids the pitfall of overfitting the equations.
Further, in a fashion analogous to the discussion earlier, comparison of these
estimates with those from a richer specification sheds light on the degree to
which the insurance variables are correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in
36. The public use sample of the GSOEP does not contain geographic identifiers, thus preclud-
ing direct examination of this issue.
37. The sample size for married women who are full-time employed was too small to obtain
satisfactory estimates, so I restrict my attention to married men, single men, and single women.























































Notes: Numbers in parentheses = column entry •+• (no job change + job change), x
2
 = Chi-
square test statistic for the null hypothesis that those with and without insurance have the same
transition rates.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.























































Notes: Numbers in parentheses = column entry -r- (no job change + job change), x
2
 = Chi-
square test statistic for the null hypothesis that those with and without insurance have the same
transition rates.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.181 Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency
Table 6.9 Probit Analysis of Job Transitions (standard errors in parentheses)
A. One-Year Transitions












































































*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
job attributes for the individuals. The results for separate probits using each
insurance lock measure are shown in the No Controls columns of table 6.9.
With a single exception—three-year transitions for married men—each of
the estimated coefficients is negative, which is consistent with the job lock
notion. In terms of statistical significance, the effect appears to be centered
among the single individuals, with the more expansive definition of insurance
lock performing the best.
As in the case of the PSID, it is useful to see whether this pattern survives
in the context of a multivariate analysis. I begin by noting the noninsurance
variables entered in the probit equation to control for other aspects of job
changes. Each probit in the Controls columns includes controls for the type of
employment (blue-collar, civil servant).
3
8 The equations also include individ-
ual attributes such as age, indicator variables for alternative educational back-
grounds, an indicator of health-related work limitations, an indicator of poor
health (in 1984), and the number of children in the household.
Finally, the equations control for resources and prices associated with the
mobility decision by including wage earnings in the current job, household
income (for married men) and the capital income (dividends and interest) of
the individual.
3
9 Descriptive statistics for key variables are shown in the appen-
dix table 6A.2.
38. Experiments with including industry dummy variables yielded very large standard errors
but had only a small effect on the point estimates for the insurance lock variables.
39. In contrast to the PSID, these equations do not have a control for job tenure (which is not
available) or pension characteristics.182 Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Returning to table 6.9, part A looks at one-year job transitions between 1984
and 1985. For married men, the coefficient on the Insurance Lock 1 variable
is negative and exceeds its standard error by roughly 1.9. Thus, especially if
one employs a one-tailed test for a negative value, there is suggestive statistical
evidence that job mobility is lower among those individuals who belong to
insurance funds for which the price of insurance is not portable. The result for
Insurance Lock 2 is qualitatively similar but even less precisely estimated. The
pattern is reversed for three-year transitions among married men; both coeffi-
cients are negative, but that for Insurance Lock 2 is weakly significant.
Recall as well from table 6.7 that the results for one-year transitions were
somewhat stronger for single individuals than for married men. In the probit
analysis, however, this is not the case. Looking at the estimated coefficients
for single men and women in part A, one finds that they are typically of the
anticipated sign but are not statistically significant at conventional levels in
either one- or two-tailed tests.
Are these results special to one-year transitions? Consider the estimates for
three-year transitions between 1984 and 1987. Again, there is no strong pattern
of reduced mobility for those having insurance lock status. For both single
men and single women, the coefficient on Insurance Lock 1 is negative but is
significant only at the 5 percent level. Moreover, the results from using the
Insurance Lock 2 variable instead are even weaker.
Taken as a whole, the parameter estimates in table 6.9 raise the possibility
that the low rate of job mobility is reduced further by the institutions of the
German health insurance system. At the same time, the statistical link is not
sufficiently firm to warrant a strong position on the basis on this evidence
alone.
4
0 Rather, the picture that emerges is one that does not support any con-
jecture of widespread labor market interference as a result of the health insur-
ance system in Germany.
6.3 Summary
The potential for employer-provided insurance to interfere with the smooth
working of the labor market has attracted considerable attention in the United
States, and some analysts have pointed to Germany as a model for a system
that avoids impediments to labor market mobility. As in the United States,
however, the provision and cost of health insurance in Germany are in part
determined by individuals' employers. Although it has not attracted compara-
ble attention, the German system also generates the potential for insurance-
related job lock.
40. I experimented with interactions of the health insurance lock variable and age, number of
children, and health status. The anecdotal evidence suggests that the benefits package does not
differ widely across sickness funds. If so, one would not expect these variables—which proxy for
differences in the value of benefits across individuals—to be significant. They were not.183 Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency
To date, much of discussion of job lock has been restricted to the use of
anecdotal evidence. As a step toward filling the research void, this paper has
been devoted to gauging the empirical magnitude of the job lock phenomenon.
On the whole, these initial results suggest no evidence of job lock in either
country. For the United States, analysis of the PSID suggests little in the way
of correlation between insurance variables and the probability of changing em-
ployers. Some suggestive correlations are present when the health insurance
variables are analyzed in isolation. However, in the presence of a rich set of
noninsurance variables to control for other aspects of the incentives to change
employers, their apparent importance disappears. This suggests that access to
richer data for each individual and employer may explain the apparent differ-
ence between these findings and those in, for example, Madrian (1992).
The results of analyzing the GSOEP data for West Germany have the same
flavor. When viewed in isolation, membership in a sickness fund for which the
price of insurance is not portable across jobs is correlated with lower mobility.
When analyzed simultaneously with a larger set of socioeconomic variables,
however, the link becomes more tenuous. A difficulty unique to this analysis
is the low overall rate of mobility among employers reported in the GSOEP.
From a slightly different perspective, the results of the empirical analysis in
each country suggest a very important result. The health insurance systems in
these countries should not be judged by their secondary effects on labor mobil-
ity, as these effects are small at best. Instead, they should be judged by their




The empirical analyses use data from two longitudinal data sets: for the United
States, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID); for Germany, the Public
Use Version of the Socioeconomic Panel of Germany (GSOEP). Since 1968,
the PSID has interviewed annually a representative sample of some five thou-
sand families. At least one member of each family was either part of the origi-
nal families interviewed in 1968 or born to a member of one of these families.
(See Survey Research Center 1984 for a complete discussion.)
The GSOEP is a more recent longitudinal data set developed at the Universi-
ties of Frankfurt and Mannheim in cooperation with the Deutsches Insti-
tut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin (DIW) and initially financed by the Ger-
man National Science Foundation. In 1990 the DIW assumed control of the
panel with funding through 1995 from the Bund-Lander-Kommission fur For-
schungsfbrderung. The panel started in the spring of 1984. It comprises184 Douglas Holtz-Eakin
about six thousand families. Nine yearly waves have been conducted (1984-
92), and six waves (1984-89) are available, providing information on calendar
year 1983 through 1988. (In 1990 the GSOEP was expanded to include a repre-
sentative sample of East Germans.) The data are representative of the German
population, including "guest workers." Wagner, Burkhauser, and Behringer
(1993) contains a detailed discussion of these data.





















































































































































(0.3693)185 Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency



































































































































































Aaron, H. 1991. Serious and unstable condition. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti-
tution.
Allen, S., R. Clark, and A. McDermed. 1991. Pensions, bonding, and lifetime jobs.
Raleigh: North Carolina State University. Mimeograph.
Brown, J., and A. Light. 1992. Interpreting panel data on job tenure. Journal of Labor
Economics 10:219-57.
Commission of the European Community. Directorate of General Employment, Indus-186 Douglas Holtz-Eakin
trial Relations, and Social Affairs. 1992. Health care. In Social protection in the
member states of the community: Situation on July 1st 1990 and evolution, 50-72.
Paris: Commission of the European Community.
Congressional Budget Office. 1992. Reducing the deficit: Spending and revenue op-
tions. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Cotton, P. 1991. Preexisting conditions 'hold Americans hostage' to employers and
insurance. Journal of the American Medical Association 265, 15 May, 2451-53.
Flynn, P. 1992. Employment-based health insurance: Coverage under COBRA continu-
ation rules. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute. Mimeograph.
Fuchs, V. 1991. National health insurance revisited. NBER Working Paper no. 3884.
Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
General Accounting Office (GAO). 1991. Health care spending control: The experience
of France, Germany, and Japan.
Glaser, W. 1991. Health insurance in practice: International variations in financing,
benefits, and problems. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Gruber, J. 1992. The efficiency of a group-specific mandated benefit: Evidence from
health insurance benefits for maternity. NBER Working Paper no. 4157. Cambridge,
Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gustman, A., and T Steinmeier. 1990. Pension portability and labor mobility: Evidence
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. NBER Working Paper no.
3252. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hamermesh, D., and S. Woodbury. 1990. Taxes, fringe benefits, and faculty. NBER
Working Paper no. 3455. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
Health Care Financing Review (HCFR). 1989. Annual supplement.
Henke, K. 1990. The Federal Republic of Germany. In Advances in health economics
and health services research. Supplement 1: Comparative health systems, 145-68.
Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
Hurst, J. 1991. Reform of health care in Germany. Health Care Financing Review
12:73-86.
Madrian, B. 1992. Employment-based health insurance and job mobility: Is there evi-
dence of job-lock? Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Mimeograph.
Mitchell, O. 1982. Fringe benefits and mobility. Journal of Human Resources
17:286-98.
. 1983. Fringe benefits and the cost of changing jobs. Industrial and Labor Rela-
tions Review 17:70-80.
-. 1990. Employee benefits and the new economy: A proposal for reform. Cali-
fornia Management Review 32:113-30.
Reinhardt, U. 1990. West Germany's health-care and health-insurance system: combin-
ing universal access with cost control. In A call for action, 3-16. U.S. Bipartisan
Commission on Comprehensive Health Care. Supplement to the Final Report.
Rovner, J. 1990. Congress tightens regulation of medigap insurance plans. Congres-
sional Quarterly Weekly Report, 3 November, 3720.
Schneider, M. 1991. Health care cost containment in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Health Care Financing Review 12:87-101.
Schulenburg, J. 1989. The West German health care financing and delivery system:
Its experiences and lessons for other nations. Paper presented at the International
Symposium on Health Care Systems. Mimeograph.
Sloan, E, and K. Adamache. 1986. Taxation and the growth of non-wage compensation.
Public Finance Quarterly 57:115-38.
Survey Research Center. 1984. User guide to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Ann Arbor, Mich.187 Health Insurance Provision and Labor Market Efficiency
Swartz, K. 1989. Counting uninsured Americans. Health Affairs 8:193.
Wagner, G., R. Burkhauser, and F. Behringer. 1993. The English language public use
file of the German Socio-Economic Panel. Journal of Human Resources 28:413-15.
Wienand, M. 1988. Health insurance. In The social system and social work in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, 43-45. Bonn: German Association for Public and Pri-
vate Welfare.
Wolfe, B. 1992. Reform of health care for the poor. IRP conference paper. University
of Wisconsin, Madison.